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A MODEL OF ABSTRACT COOPERATION IN 
GAMES OF UNCERTAINTY 
Hillel Bavli*
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Sir Ronald Fisher remarked that it was “Darwin’s chief contribution, not 
only to Biology but to the whole of natural science, to have brought to light 
a process by which contingencies a priori improbable, are given, in the 
process of time, an increasing probability, until it is their non-occurrence 
rather than their occurrence which becomes highly improbable.”1
I argue that, contrary to the popular assertion that coordinated pricing 
necessarily requires voluntary coordination,
  The idea 
that evolutionary processes naturally propel a state of affairs toward a 
higher, perhaps more complex or advanced, state of affairs is one that may 
extend to any context characterized by a dynamic time frame, including 
oligopoly models of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
2
Professor Donald Turner, in his seminal treatise on the definition of 
“agreement” under the Sherman Act,
 oligopoly markets may evolve 
to a state of cooperation—one of collective profit maximization—absent a 
conscious state of coordination among the players, or even knowledge of 
such cooperation. 
3
 
* J.D. candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law.  Special thanks to my family 
and friends for their support, and to Professor Barry Hawk for his guidance and advice. 
 touches upon the idea that oligopoly 
may naturally precipitate parallel non-competitive pricing that may 
reasonably be considered individual conduct, but stops short of asserting 
that cooperative equilibria may result without any form of conscious 
commitment to coordinate prices.  Turner argues that oligopoly markets are 
defined by their interdependent nature and that each player will rationally 
and naturally calculate the consequences of its price decisions with regard 
 1. Bert James Lowenberg, Darwin Scholarship of the Darwin Year, 11 AM. Q. 526, 
528 (Winter 1959) (quoting JULIAN HUXLEY, ET AL., EDS., EVOLUTION AS A PROCESS 91 
(1954)). 
 2. See infra notes 102-106 and accompanying text. 
 3. Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious 
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 655 (1962). 
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to the expected reactions of its competitors.4
While it is true that cooperation is a natural consequence of the 
interdependent nature of oligopoly markets, it is not necessarily a result of 
conduct based on conscious regard of future reaction by competitors.  
While Turner proposes a theory of cooperation based on forward-looking 
consideration of future reaction, and similarly, George Stigler presents a 
theory of cooperation based on fear of detection and retaliation,
  This explanation does not go 
far enough. 
5
Specifically, George Stigler “reasoned that ‘oligopolists wish to collude 
to maximize joint profits’ but ‘if any member of any agreement can 
secretly violate it, he will gain larger profits than by conforming to it,’ so a 
model of oligopoly should focus on the ‘problem of policing a collusive 
agreement.’”
 I propose 
a theory of evolution to cooperation based on the progression of 
consequences from previous actions. 
6
Many economic and legal models determine a firm’s ability to detect 
cheating by analyzing the quality and quantity of information exchanged 
among firms.
 
7  For example, industry trade associations are often accused 
of existing for the sole purpose of facilitating tacit collusion.  Stigler’s 
model goes a step further: it allows participants in a collusive arrangement 
to infer that a rival is secretly cutting prices, and defecting from the 
arrangement, if they unexpectedly lose many old customers or 
unexpectedly gain few new customers.8
This paper extends Stigler’s model from a theory of tacit interaction and 
sustained collusion based on a player’s ability to detect other players’ 
defections to a theory of independent action based on a player’s natural 
tendency to implement payoff-maximizing strategies by comparing 
previous performance to current performance and adjusting conduct 
accordingly.  I propose that neither conscious coordination nor information 
exchange is necessary to achieve cooperative equilibria.  Rather, an 
evolutionary process that parallels Darwinian biological evolution propels 
economic markets toward states of cooperative equilibrium. 
 
 
 
 4. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. 
 6. Gregory J. Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling 
Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 719, 728 (2004) (quoting George J. 
Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 46 (1964)). 
 7. See STIGLER, supra note 6. 
 8. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 728. 
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II. WHEN COLLECTIVE INCENTIVES AND INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVES 
CLASH: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA 
Imagine a situation in which a troublemaker is asked to report to the 
high school principal’s office for investigation of his involvement in a 
prank.  Earlier that morning, the student, Jim, along with one other student, 
John, released a chicken into the men’s restroom.  The principal sat the 
students in separate rooms and spoke to each individually.  He informed 
Jim of the following: Jim, as well as John, was being investigated for 
pulling a prank earlier that morning, in which he had released a chicken in 
the men’s restroom.  Jim had been seen with John entering the men’s 
bathroom during first period classes holding a large brown sack.  Neither 
Jim nor John had followed school protocol, which required that they report 
to the school office to get a hall pass anytime they left class for any reason, 
even to use the restroom.  For this infringement, the principal had authority 
to suspend the students for one month.  For releasing the chicken in the 
restroom, the principal had authority to suspend them for 18 months.  The 
principal, however, lacked sufficient evidence to condemn Jim or John as 
the culprits of the chicken prank. 
The principal asked that Jim testify regarding John’s involvement in the 
prank.  Jim’s testimony would provide enough evidence to allow the 
principal to suspend John for 18 months, and in return, Jim would receive 
no punishment at all.  If, however, John also testified against Jim, each 
student would be condemned to a twelve-month suspension (their 
respective eighteen-month suspensions would be downgraded to twelve-
month suspensions as reward for their testimonies).  If Jim refused to 
testify but John testified against Jim, Jim would receive an eighteen-month 
suspension and John would receive no punishment.  Finally, if neither of 
the students testified against the other, the principal would have sufficient 
evidence only to suspend each of them for one month for failing to obtain a 
hall pass, but he would lack evidence to suspend them as the chicken prank 
culprits. 
The foregoing example illustrates a well-known and much analyzed 
phenomenon dubbed the “Prisoner’s Dilemma.”9  The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
occurs when individual incentives and collective incentives clash.  
Assuming that Jim wished only to minimize the severity of his own 
punishment,10
 
 9. Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher invented the Prisoner’s Dilemma game around 
1950, and A. W. Tucker formalized the game shortly thereafter.  ROBERT AXELROD, THE 
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 216 n.2 (1984). 
 and was indifferent to the severity of John’s punishment, his 
 10. Severity is presumably in proportion to length of suspension. 
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optimal strategy was to testify against John regardless of whether he 
believed John would testify against him.11
Thus, the dilemma is clear: Jim and John, each strategizing individually 
and in their respective self-interests, would testify against each other and 
consequently each receive a twelve-month suspension.  Had they, however, 
each strategized to minimize the aggregate severity of their respective 
punishments—had they “cooperated”—each refusing to testify against the 
other, they would have achieved the optimal collective outcome, a mere 
one-month suspension each. 
  If John testified, Jim’s optimal 
decision was to testify since a twelve-month suspension is less severe than 
an eighteen month suspension.  If John refused to testify, Jim’s optimal 
decision was to testify anyway, since no punishment at all is less severe 
than a one-month suspension, and since Jim was indifferent to the severity 
of John’s punishment. 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is “common in everything from personal 
relations to international relations.”12  It applies to interactions between 
bacteria, individuals, nations, and corporations.13  The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
is the foundation of “many of the best-developed models of important 
political, social, and economic processes.”14  Oligopoly markets are 
characterized by interdependence among market suppliers (“firms”): each 
firm’s profits are products of the decisions made by other firms in the 
market.  Oligopoly market structures thus embody the elements of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma and are among the most examined of such contexts.15
Firms can maximize industry profits by behaving like a single 
monopolist and then dividing the profits among themselves.
 
16  The problem 
is that each firm has the temptation to cheat;17
Thus, once again, a dilemma unfolds: each firm, acting in its individual 
self-interest, chooses to overproduce (or underprice).
 each firm individually 
maximizes its profit in any round of decision-making by expanding its 
output beyond the agreed-upon level (or, alternatively, by decreasing its 
price below the agreed-upon monopoly price). 
18
 
 11. Remember, Jim and John are seated in separate rooms and are presumably unable to 
communicate. 
  A competitive, 
 12. AXELROD, supra note 9, at 27. 
 13. Id. at 28. 
 14. Id. 
 15. An oligopoly defines an economic market with few competitors such that production 
decisions affect the product’s price.  HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A 
MODERN APPROACH 468 (5th ed. 1999). 
 16. Id. at 483-84. 
 17. Id. at 484. 
 18. A Cournot Model describes firms as choosing their quantities and allowing the 
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profit-minimizing price emerges.  Had the firms cooperated by foregoing 
the opportunity to overproduce (or undercut the others’ prices), a 
monopolistic, profit-maximizing price would have surfaced. 
The situations, or “games,” described above are such that “players” each 
simultaneously make a single decision.  Absent a mechanism of enforcing 
cooperation, the Prisoner’s Dilemma holds true and the players forego the 
collectively optimal outcome.  No player has reason to trust that the others 
will forego acting for the individual good for the sake of the collective 
good.  A different outcome results, however, if the game is played 
repeatedly by the same players.19
“Repeated play allows players to respond to each other’s actions, and so 
each player must consider the reactions of his opponents in making his 
decision.”
 
20  Repeated play provides a critical enforcement mechanism: If a 
player cheats, or “defects” from a collusive arrangement in one period, the 
other players can “punish” him by defecting in future periods.21  “In a 
repeated game, each player has the opportunity to establish a reputation for 
cooperation, and thereby encourage the other player to do the same.”22
III. GAME THEORY, OLIGOPOLY, AND THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA 
  The 
presumption, of course, is that players have the ability to detect when other 
players are cheating.  Therefore, models of cooperation often focus on 
players’ ability to detect defection. 
Game theory is a “collection of tools for predicting outcomes23 for a 
group of interacting agents, where an action of a single agent directly 
affects the payoffs (welfare or profits) of other participating agents.”24  
Game theory is particularly useful in situations where the number of 
players is small and the decisions of each player significantly affect the 
payoff of other players.25  Thus, oligopoly markets, by reason of their 
interdependent nature, are ripe for game-theoretic analysis.26
 
market to determine the price.  A Bertrand Model describes firms as setting their prices and 
allowing the market to determine the quantity sold.  Id. at 482. 
 
 19. Id. at 498. 
 20. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with 
Discounting and with Incomplete Information, 54 ECONOMETRICA 533, 533 (1986). 
 21. VARIAN, supra note 15, at 498. 
 22. Id. 
 23. “Outcomes” refer to a list of actions adopted by each participant.  OZ SHY, 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 11-12 (1995). 
 24. Id. at 11. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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A. Normal Form Games 
A normal form game is one in which each player must make decisions 
without knowing what the other is doing.27  Alternatively stated, each 
player moves simultaneously.28  Consider the example described above, in 
which two high school students must choose, simultaneously and without 
knowing what the other will choose, whether to testify against the other.29  
In this example, there are four possible outcomes:30
 
  (Testify, Testify), 
(Testify, Don’t Testify), (Don’t Testify, Testify), (Don’t Testify, Don’t 
Testify).  The various outcomes and respective payoffs are conveniently 
and conventionally displayed in matrix form. 
JOHN: 
Testify                   Don’t Testify 
JIM: Testify 
        Don’t Testify 
 
The above table is a bimatrix31 that describes each set of outcomes as 
well as the resulting payoffs that each player receives.  By convention, the 
first payoff in each cell is that of the row player; the second payoff is that 
of the column player.32  In this example, there is a “dominant strategy,” one 
optimal strategy choice for each player regardless of the decision made by 
the other player.33  Each player is best off choosing to testify, regardless of 
whether the other player testifies.  The game’s equilibrium, therefore, is the 
dominant strategy outcome (Testify, Testify).34
A pair of strategies is said to be a “Nash Equilibrium” if each player’s 
choice is optimal, given the other player’s choice.
 
35  More formally, an 
outcome â = (â1, â2, . . ., âN) (where âi Є Ai
 
 27. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 6 (1994). 
 for every i = 1, 2, . . ., N) is a 
Nash Equilibrium if no player would find it beneficial to deviate, provided 
that all other players do not deviate from their strategies played at the Nash 
 28. SHY, supra note 23, at 12. 
 29. See id. at 6-9. 
 30. Remember, “outcome” in game theory jargon means a set of actions adopted by 
each player. 
 31. A bimatrix is a matrix in which each cell has two numbers.  BAIRD ET AL., supra 
note 27, at 10. 
 32. Id. 
 33. VARIAN, supra note 15, at 493. 
 34. Not every game contains dominant strategy equilibria.  Id. at 494. 
 35. Id. 
-12     -12 0       -18 
-18      0 -1        -1 
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outcome.36
 
  For every player i, i = 1, 2, . . ., N, 
Πi(âi, â¬i) ≥ Πi(ai, â¬i) for every âi Є Ai.37
 
 
Where Πi represents player i’s payoff (welfare or profits).  It should be 
noted that, a dominant action equilibrium is also a Nash Equilibrium,38 and 
further, that there can be multiple Nash Equilibria or no Nash Equilibria at 
all.39
B. Repeated Games 
 
Up to this point, I have discussed one-shot games, i.e., games that 
consist of one period in which both players simultaneously choose their 
actions.  Repeated games are simply one-shot games that are identically 
repeated.40  As mentioned above, where cooperative equilibrium may fail 
in a one-shot game, it may emerge in a repeated game.41  In the repeated 
game, as in the one-shot game, each player acts simultaneously during each 
round of play.42  In the repeated game, however, it is assumed that all 
players can observe and monitor their own actions as well as those of all 
other players in all previous rounds.  That is to say, they remember 
perfectly the game’s “history.”43
A game can be one of finite or infinite repetitions.
 
44  A finitely repeated 
game is one in which the number of periods, or rounds of play, is fixed.45  
An infinitely repeated game repeats indefinitely.46
 
 36. SHY, supra note 
  While the distinction 
may at first seem insignificant, particularly in games with many, yet finite, 
repetitions, it is often a critical factor in determining a game’s outcome.  
Specifically, “backward induction,” a technique used to determine a game’s 
equilibrium outcomes by seeking the Nash Equilibrium in the final round 
and working backwards to solve the Nash Equilibrium in each preceding 
round, is inapplicable to infinitely repeated games, since there is no final 
23, at 18. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 19. 
 39. Id. at 19-20. 
 40. Id. at 28. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 29. 
 45. See VARIAN, supra note 15, at 498. 
 46. Id. at 498-99. 
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period.47  The repeated prisoner’s dilemma is the classic example: in games 
of fixed finite “horizon,” or periods of play, the only equilibrium is one of 
both players defecting in every period, whereas a cooperative equilibrium 
is sustainable in games of infinite horizon.48
Whether an infinitely repeated game results in cooperative equilibrium 
depends, in part, on the players’ “time discount factor.”
 
49  The time 
discount factor represents a player’s valuation of future payoffs relative to 
current payoffs.  Specifically, the time discount factor is “the amount by 
which the value of a payoff in the next period must be adjusted to reflect its 
value in the present period.”50  Assuming that defecting from cooperation 
in one period will trigger punishment in future periods, cooperation is 
easier to sustain when players have higher time discount factors, since the 
threat of punishment in future rounds is stronger.51
C. The Folk Theorem, Player Strategies, and Nash Equilibria 
 
Repeated games allow for outcomes that would not occur in one-shot 
games because players fear retaliation.52  The “Folk Theorem” expresses 
this phenomenon.53  It states that “any individually rational outcome can 
arise as a Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games with sufficiently 
little discounting.”54  The equilibria of an infinitely repeated game can, for 
example, be infinitely many sets of quantities between the “Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium” quantities—that is, the set of quantities such that each 
competitor is satisfied with its quantity given its rivals’ quantities55—and 
the jointly payoff-maximizing quantities.56  Game theory says little, 
however, about which equilibrium should result or how equilibrium is 
achieved.57
Economic literature has spawned a multitude of models exploring such 
questions.
 
58
 
 47. SHY, supra note 
  Few economists dispute that retaliatory threat plays a 
23, at 30. 
 48. FUDENBERG & MASKIN, supra note 20, at 534.  Still, there is evidence that suggests 
cooperation in games with a large yet finite number of repetitions.  Id.  at 534-35 (providing 
a possible explanation of such results). 
 49. SHY, supra note 23, at 33. 
 50. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 27, at 168. 
 51. See SHY, supra note 23, at 31-33. 
 52. FUDENBERG & MASKING, supra note 20, at 533. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 722. 
 56. Id. at 731. 
 57. Id. at 731-32. 
 58. Id. at 732. 
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significant role in attaining and maintaining cooperative equilibrium.59  
Economists have long sought after the most efficacious punishment 
strategies.60  In quantity-setting games, it has been shown that the most 
effective enforcement scheme is to punish a defecting player as much as 
possible for one and only one period of the game.61
Another much-explored area concerns the ability of a player to detect 
defection.  After all, effective enforcement of defection first requires its 
detection.  The issue of uncertainty concerning other players’ actions is 
thus an important strain of equilibrium analysis.
 
62  For example, if a player 
can only observe the market price, should the player interpret a price 
decline as another player’s defection meriting punishment, or simply a 
decline in consumer demand?63  It has been shown that if the market price 
falls sufficiently a player’s optimal strategy is to infer defection, and 
therefore impose punishment.64  Such models result in random price wars, 
since random fluctuations in demand may cause erroneous inferences of 
defection.65
Strategies in which defection triggers a retaliatory response have proved 
useful in the evolution of cooperation.
 
66  Indeed, the Tit-for-Tat strategy, a 
simple “policy of cooperating on the first move and then doing whatever 
the other player did on the previous move,”67 won numerous computer-run 
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game tournaments in which many different 
strategies were matched against one another.68
 
 59. See Edward H. Chamberlin, Duopoly: Value Where Sellers Are Few, 44 Q.J. ECON. 
63, 85 (1929); Stigler, supra note 
 
6, at 44. 
 60. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 733. 
 61. Id. (citing Dilip Abreu, On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with 
Discounting, 56 ECONOMETRICA 383, 384-86 (1988)); Dilip Abreu, Extremal Equilibria of 
Oligopolistic Supergames, 39 J. ECON. THEORY 191 (1986); CARL SHAPIRO, THEORIES OF 
OLIGOPOLY BEHAVIOR, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUS. ORG. 329, 366-70 (Richard Schmalensee 
& Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); STEPHEN MARTIN, ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 301-
04 (2d ed. 2002)). 
 62. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 733. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. (citing Edward J. Green & Robert H. Porter, Noncooperative Collusion under 
Imperfect Price Information, 52 ECONOMETRICA 87, 89-94 (1984); Robert H. Porter, 
Optimal Cartel Trigger Price Strategies, 29 J. ECON. THEORY 313 (1983)). 
 65. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 733. 
 66. Id. 
 67. AXELROD, supra note 9, at 13. 
 68. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 733-34. 
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IV. TACIT COLLUSION AND ANTITRUST LAW 
Tacit collusion, in the context of antitrust law, refers to the phenomenon 
whereby “competing sellers might be able to coordinate their pricing 
without conspiring in the usual sense of the term——that is, without any 
overt or detectable acts of communication.”69  Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint 
of trade.”70  These terms embrace the single concept of agreement.71  
“Section 1 reaches every arrangement in which multiple parties have a 
‘unity of purpose or a common design and understanding or a meeting of 
minds’72——every ‘conscious commitment to a common scheme.’”73
Illegality under Section 1 of the Sherman Act is generally predicated 
upon the existence of an agreement.
 
74  But what exactly constitutes an 
agreement is a problem that has recurrently plagued antitrust law, and one 
to which the current analysis speaks.75
A. The Case against Condemnation of Tacit Collusion as a Section 1 
Violation: The Interdependence Theory of Pricing 
 
Professor Donald Turner argues that “oligopoly price behavior,”76 or 
“conscious parallelism,”77 can be expressed “as individual behavior—
rational individual decision in the light of relevant economic facts”—rather 
than behavior based upon agreement.78  “We could say that each seller has 
simply decided individually, perhaps after bitter experience, that it is more 
profitable not to indulge in price competition under any but the most 
pressing circumstances, appealing as price cutting might appear to be from 
a less experienced viewpoint.”79
 
 69. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 52-53 (2d ed. 2001). 
 
 70. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). 
 71. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 734 (citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1400a, at 1 (2d ed. 2003)). 
 72. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 734 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 
U.S. 752, 768 (1984)). 
 73. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 734 (citing E. States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. 
United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612 (1914)). 
 74. TURNER, supra note 3, at 655. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 666. 
 77. Id. at 663. 
 78. Id. at 666. 
 79. Id. 
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Turner illustrates his point with the “salient facts” in American Tobacco 
Co. v. United States.80  Three large cigarette companies, who together 
accounted for 90% of all cigarette sales, charged identical prices from 1928 
to 1940, changing prices only seven times in that period.81  Such price 
changes would be made by one company, to be followed almost 
immediately by the others, who would not sell further to dealers until their 
price changes were effected.82
Despite a general economic depression and declining costs, the three 
companies substantially raised their prices and thereby significantly 
increased profits.
 
83  Turner explains that such pricing behavior, “in the face 
of declining costs and weakening demand,” is incontrovertibly 
“noncompetitive.”84  But no “economist worthy of the name” would 
conclude on the basis of these facts alone that such behavior is a result of 
an actual price agreement.85  Rather, as economic theory suggests, the 
behavior is a natural result of an oligopoly market, in which parallel action 
may arise “without overt communication or agreement, but solely through a 
rational calculation by each seller of what the consequences of his price 
decision would be, taking into account the probable or virtually certain 
reactions of his competitors.”86  Alternatively stated, rational behavior, 
even independent rational behavior, militates against defection from the 
cooperative equilibrium, since any defection will, with virtual certainty, be 
met with retaliatory defections.  Oligopolists base pricing decisions in part 
on anticipated reactions to such decisions; they are “interdependent” with 
respect to their pricing.87
Turner concludes that prohibiting companies from taking into account 
the probable reactions to their pricing decisions, forcing companies to 
ignore the interdependent nature of oligopolistic markets, would “demand 
such irrational behavior that full compliance would be virtually 
impossible.”
 
88  Further, Turner argues that when real-world complications 
are present, the emergence of “a pattern of noncompetitive pricing . . . 
requires something which we could, not unreasonably, call a ‘meeting of 
minds.’”89
 
 80. TURNER, supra note 
 
3, at 661. 
 81. Id.; see also Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 805-08 (1946). 
 82. TURNER, supra note 3, at 661. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. POSNER, supra note 69, at 56. 
 88. TURNER, supra note 3, at 669. 
 89. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 772 (quoting TURNER, supra note 3, at 664). 
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B. The Case for Condemnation of Tacit Collusion as a Section 1 
Violation 
The requirement of agreement, according to Judge Richard Posner, does 
not exclude the possibility of a tacit agreement, and to confine the Sherman 
Act to cases involving explicit communication between parties is 
uneconomical and ill-aligned with the purposes of the Act.90
Posner argues that “there is no distortion of accepted meanings in 
viewing tacit collusion as a form of concerted rather than unilateral 
activity.”
 
91  Courts do not distinguish between essentially linguistic forms 
of communication.92  “A knowing wink can mean more than words.”93  To 
say that rivals may communicate by observing each others’ marketplace 
actions does not greatly stretch the meaning of communication.94  Posner 
argues that “[I]f seller A restricts his output in the expectation that B will do 
likewise, and B restricts his output in a like expectation, there is a literal 
meeting of the minds—a mutual understanding——even if there is no overt 
communication.”95  Posner asserts that such meeting of the minds 
constitutes an agreement within the meaning of the Sherman Act.96
Posner finds fault with courts’ focus on conspiracy doctrine rather than 
on price theory.  While the relevance of economic evidence to establishing 
price fixing plays an increasingly important role in courts, most courts hold 
that such evidence should be used only to help the trier of fact infer the 
existence of an overt agreement, and that such inference of conspiracy is 
indispensable to finding a Sherman Act violation.
 
97  The problem is that 
not all price fixing activities actually cause a significant increase in price or 
reduction in output, and perhaps more serious, overt communication is not 
always necessary to significantly raise prices to collusive levels.98
Furthermore, Posner regards tacit collusion as the most harmful of all 
  The law 
is thus at once under-inclusive and over-inclusive with respect to the 
Sherman Act’s goals of pursuing economic efficiency. 
 
 90. POSNER, supra note 69, at 94. 
 91. Id.  Turner and Posner are in agreement on this point.  Turner does not brand tacit 
collusion as necessarily individual, rather than concerted, action.  He maintains merely that 
neither point of view is unreasonable.  He claims that oligopoly pricing behavior may be 
described as individual behavior “as well as it can be described as ‘agreement.’”  TURNER, 
supra note 3, at 666. 
 92. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 735. 
 93. Id. (quoting Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1965)). 
 94. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 735 (emphasis added). 
 95. POSNER, supra note 69, at 94. 
 96. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1996). 
 97. POSNER, supra note 69, at 93-94. 
 98. Id. at 53. 
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oligopoly conduct.99  Exclusion of tacit collusion from the Sherman Act’s 
ambit is paradoxical in that it fails to proscribe collusion where proscription 
is most necessary: in markets that are highly propitious to collusive 
equilibria.100  It is situations in which collusion may be accomplished via 
market actions, rather than those which require overt communication, in 
which collusion will be most maintainable and probably most harmful.101
Posner proposes that oligopoly behavior be studied “in terms of the 
theory of cartels.”
 
102  According to this view, oligopoly is necessary but not 
sufficient for successful price fixing.103  Posner argues that coordinated 
pricing “is not an unconscious state.”104  Rather, “voluntary actions by the 
sellers are necessary to translate the bare condition of an oligopoly market 
into a situation of noncompetitive pricing.”105  Accordingly, such voluntary 
action, whether express or tacit, falls within Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.106
C. Information Exchange and the Role it Plays in Maintaining 
Collusive Equilibria 
 
George Stigler sought to reconcile the hypothesis that oligopolists wish 
to collude to maximize joint profits “with facts, such as that collusion is 
impossible for many firms and collusion is much more effective in some 
circumstances than in others.”107  Stigler argues: “The reconciliation is 
found in the problem of policing a collusive agreement, which proves to be 
a problem in the theory of information.”108
Antitrust law has developed a price-fixing rule that prosecutes and 
punishes “actual” agreements to fix price.
 
109
 
 99. Id. at 55.  See also Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct under the 
Antitrust Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 9, 31 (2004). 
  Market players, therefore, 
may take all the necessary steps to coordinate their pricing but stop short of 
 100. Id. (citing David L. Meyer, The Seventh Circuit’s High Fructose Corn Syrup 
Decision—Sweet for Plaintiffs, Sticky for Defendants, ANTITRUST, Fall 2002, at 67, 71). 
 101. Id. at 30-31. 
 102. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 774 (quoting Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the 
Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1569-75 (1969)). 
 103. Michael K. Vaska, Conscious Parallelism and Price Fixing: Defining the Boundary, 
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 508, 514 (1985). 
 104. POSNER, supra note 69, at 97. 
 105. VASKA, supra note 103, at 514 (quoting POSNER, supra note 104, at 1575). 
 106. VASKA, supra note 103, at 514. 
 107. STIGLER, supra note 6, at 44. 
 108. Id. 
 109. POSNER, supra note 69, at 159. 
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any actual “agreement.”110  The most important of such steps is “the 
exchange of information as to what prices each seller is charging, or 
charged in the recent past, or intends to charge in the future.”111  Posner 
asserts that information-exchanges “foster collusive pricing both by 
enabling convergence on a single supracompetitive price and by facilitating 
detection of, and thereby discouraging, sales below that price.”112
Thus, information exchange relates to collusive pricing as follows: As 
mentioned above, threat of retaliation holds collusion in tact.  A credible 
threat requires the ability to enforce the collusive arrangement by punishing 
defection.  Enforcement, in turn, requires detection of defections.  Finally, 
as asserted by Stigler and Posner, information exchange is the mechanism 
by which detection is facilitated. 
 
The problem is that unlike collusive pricing itself, information 
exchanges offer significant social benefits.113  Generally, firms need market 
price information to make intelligent output decisions, and need competitor 
output and capacity plans to make intelligent decisions concerning their 
productive capacity.114  Information exchange is necessary for the 
operation of an efficient market.115  “Information is thus a two-edged 
sword: it is necessary if the competitive process is to work properly, but it 
can also facilitate collusion.”116
V. A MODEL OF EVOLUTION TOWARD COOPERATION 
 
Assume, for the sake of simplicity, a non-stochastic duopoly market—a 
market with constant demand and only two players (i = 1, 2)—playing in a 
game of infinite repetitions (t = 1, 2, 3, . . ., ∞ ).  Further, assume vast 
information uncertainty: neither player has access to any information with 
regard to market conditions or to the other player.  Each player has 
exclusive knowledge of its previous and present pricing as well as its 
previous and present profits, but neither player has knowledge concerning 
the other player’s past, present, or future pricing decisions, the other 
player’s cost function, profits, or even knowledge that the other player 
exists.  Neither player knows whether he is the only player in the market, 
whether there are two players in the market, or whether there are numerous 
players in the market. 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 159-60. 
 112. Id. at 160. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
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Each player strategizes as follows: 
Where ai,t is Player i’s action in period t, and Ai
 
 is the set of all of Player 
i’s actions, 
ai,t Є A
 
i 
ai,t is a function of Player i’s payoff (profits) in round t-1, πi,t-1, and 
Player i’s predetermined probability of increasing price one unit (discussed 
further infra), Φ i
 
, 
ai,t(πi,t-1, Φi,),117
 
 
and Player i’s payoff in period t, π i,t is a function of Player 1’s action in 
period t, a1,t and Player 2’s action in period t, a
 
2,t 
πi,t(a1,t, a2,t
 
) 
1) In any given period, t = 1, 2, . . ., ∞, there is a probability, Φ i,
 
, 
that price will increase λ above the price in period t-1: 
Pi,t (ai,t = ai,t-1 + λ) = Φ
 
i 
2) Set price equal to α in period t = 1: 
 
ai,1
 
 = α 
3) In every period, t, set price, ai,t, equal to the price in period t-1, 
ai,t-1
a. Price is increased to a
, unless either: 
i,t-1 + λ by the probability function, Φi
b. Profits in period t-1, π
. 
i,t-1, were less than profits in period t-
2, π i,t-2, and t-3, π i,t-3
 
. 
πi,t-1 < πi,t-2 and πi,t-1 < π
 
 117. Remember, neither player’s actions are direct functions of the other player’s 
previous actions, since that information is unknown.  The other player’s actions will, 
however, cause indirect reactions since each player’s profits are functions of all players’ 
actions; in turn, actions are functions of profits. 
i,t-3 
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4) If 3b occurs, decrease price λ below the price in period t-1: 
 
If πi,t-1 < πi,t-2 and πi,t-1 < πi,t-3 → ai,t = ai,t-1
 
 – λ. 
5) In any given period, do not set price below α: 
 
ai,t
 
 ≥ α. 
For the sake of simplicity, the strategy described above fails to calculate 
appropriate (real market) values of Φ i
Consider an outcome that may result from such a game, in which both 
players use the strategy described above, which I will refer to as the Tester 
Strategy.  Assume Φ
, α, and λ.  The model, nevertheless, 
suffices to indicate a possible tendency toward cooperative equilibrium in 
the absence of any conscious commitment to coordinate pricing. 
i
 
 = 1/5, α = 4, and λ = 1.  Further, assume the jointly 
profit-maximizing price, Ψ, to be eight. 
 
Player 1’s and Player 2’s actions are respectively listed in the top and 
bottom rows of each box.  Player-actions are listed in groups of five for 
clarity.   
Each player sets price in t = 1 to α = 4 pursuant to rule two.  Since Φ i = 
1/5, one of every five actions results in a price-increase of λ above the price 
in period t-1 pursuant to rule one.118
 
 118. See the bimatrix above: Players both begin with a price of four.  Each player effects 
a price elevation (in this instance, to five) one in every five actions (since the probability 
function, Φi, is equal to one-fifth).  In the example provided, both players have equal 
probability functions.  This, however, does not necessarily imply that they elevate price 
simultaneously—just that the probability of elevating their respective prices is equal (i.e., 
both will randomly elevate price once in every set of five actions).  Thus, approximately 
  In the period after such increase, 
Player 1 
Player 2 
44445 
44544 
44454 
45444 
45444 
44544 
44445 
44454 
44445 
44445 
55556 
56555 
55655 
65555 
56555 
55556 
55565 
55655 
Player 1 
Player 2 
55556 
55556 
66676 
67666 
67666 
66676 
66766 
66667 
76666 
66676 
66667 
66667 
77778 
87777 
77787 
78777 
77877 
77787 
Player 1 
Player 2 
78777 
77877 
77778 
77778 
89888 
88898 
98888 
89888 
88988 
88889 
88898 
88988 
88889 
88889 
88988 
88898 
88898 
88889 
Player 1 
Player 2 
89888 
88898 
89888 
88898 
88898 
88898 
88898 
88988 
89888 
98888 
88988 
98888 
98888 
88898 
88889 
88889 
88988 
89888 
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Player i will maintain the elevated price, pursuant to rule three, unless 
profits during the elevated period decrease below profits in each of the two 
preceding periods.  Note that Player i’s price-elevation will cause profits to 
decrease below those of the two preceding periods unless the other player 
matches his elevation, in which case both players’ profits will increase.119
Additionally, notice that the players strategize to lower price only if 
profits decrease below those of the two preceding periods, rather than that 
of only the single preceding period.  Otherwise the players would engage in 
price wars every period after one player “tested” the market by raising 
price for one period and then returned to the preceding price if profits did 
not increase.
 
120  The disadvantage of such a strategy is that it may allow 
another player to exploit the somewhat forgiving strategy by defecting only 
once in succession.121
The success of the Tester Strategy depends on the conditions by which 
the market or game is defined.  The game described above provides a 
setting ripe for Tester Strategy success.  First, the market is defined as non-
 
 
once in every set of twenty-five actions the players’ price elevations occur simultaneously.  
In the example provided, price is elevated simultaneously from four to five in the twenty-
fifth period.  Similarly, twenty-five periods again pass before price is elevated 
simultaneously from five to six, and so on and so forth. 
 119. Take, for example, Player 1’s first six actions.  Player 1 begins by setting price at 
four (pursuant to rule two) and continues pricing at four until its profits decrease below its 
profits in the two preceding periods, or until the probability function takes effect (pursuant 
to rule three).  In none of the first four periods are profits lower than they were in the two 
preceding periods.  Therefore, Player 1 maintains a price of four until the fifth period, when 
the probability function elevates the price to five.  Now, in period five, Player 1 profits less 
than it did in the two preceding periods (since Player 1 alone elevates its price in period 
five) and, therefore, lowers its price to four again in period six (pursuant to rule four).  If, 
however, both prices are elevated to five simultaneously, as in period twenty-five, neither 
firm’s profits decrease below those of the two preceding periods, and, therefore, both 
maintain the elevated price of five (again, pursuant to rule three). 
 120. Assume, for example, a strategy in which a profit-decrease below only the single 
preceding period triggers the return to a lower price, ai,t-1 – λ (as opposed to the example 
described above where, in order to trigger a reduction in price, a profit-decrease below the 
two preceding periods is required).  In period twenty-seven, where Player 2 alone raises its 
price from five to six, Player 1’s profits increase while Player 2’s profits decrease (since 
only Player 2 elevated its price).  If Player 1’s strategy only required profits to decrease 
below the single preceding period, Player 2’s return to a price of five (pursuant to rule four), 
in period twenty-eight, would trigger a decrease in Player 1’s price from five to four, since 
its profits were higher in the single preceding period, where Player 2, alone, elevated price.  
If both players implemented such a strategy, a price war would erupt and would continue 
until both players’ pricing returned to α = 4 (the lowest possible price, pursuant to rule five).  
See AXELROD, supra note 9, at 13. 
 121. Punishing defection may also be affected by the timing of the victim’s price-
elevation.  The problem of such exploitation is to some extent alleviated by the conditions of 
vast uncertainty enumerated above.  Conditions of greater certainty, however, may require 
further strategy elements that account for the possibility of such exploitation. 
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stochastic.  Therefore, changes in profitability will correlate relatively well 
with changes in a competitor’s action.  Second, the market is defined as a 
duopoly.  Therefore, inappropriate “punishments” and, thus, the number of 
periods required to achieve “cooperation” are minimized.122
Use of the Tester Strategy by both players results in price-convergence 
toward the cooperative equilibrium.  At equilibrium, both players price at 
eight, the joint profit-maximizing price, but each attempts to raise its price 
once in every five periods.  A price increase above eight by one or both 
players will be maintained for that period alone, and price will return to the 
cooperative equilibrium, eight, in period t + 1.  If one player alone raises 
price above eight, his profits will decrease as in any other period in which 
he alone raised his price.  Similarly, if both players simultaneously raise 
prices, profits will decrease, since eight is the joint profit-maximizing price.  
In either case, the increase results in a return to the price in period t-1, the 
cooperative equilibrium, pursuant to rule four. 
  Third, the 
game is defined by infinite repetitions.  Therefore, players have an 
indefinite amount of time to establish a set of prices that maximizes 
profitability.  Finally, the game is defined by vast information uncertainty.  
The Tester Strategy, which tests the market to elicit greater profits and 
react to changes in profits accordingly, is prone to converge toward a 
profit-maximizing price if provided with the opportunity to do so (the other 
player’s strategy is “cooperative”), but will remain at a competitive price if 
not provided with the opportunity to raise prices (the other player’s strategy 
is “uncooperative”). 
It is important to note that to achieve cooperative equilibrium it is 
necessary neither that players have similar cost structures nor that Φi = 1/5, 
α = 4, or that λ = 1.  Such variables affect the equilibrium price as well as 
the number of periods required to reach such equilibrium.  It does not, 
however, affect whether cooperative equilibrium is reached.123
In the case of Φ
 
i = 1/5, for example, prices are increased by both players 
simultaneously, and thereby moved toward cooperative equilibrium once in 
twenty-five periods, whereas if Φ i
 
 122. I hesitate to use the term “punishment,” since players are not reacting directly to 
each other’s actions.  I use the term in order to maintain consistent usage of terminology.  
“Punishment” in this context simply refers to a decrease in one player’s profits resulting 
from another player’s price decrease below the established “cooperative” price.  Similarly, 
terms as “cooperation” and “cooperative,” in the context of such a model in which players 
do not directly observe each other’s actions, refer to a state of affairs in which both players 
have pricing structures such that each player’s profits increase as a result. 
 = 1/6, prices would increase 
simultaneously, and thereby move toward cooperative equilibrium once in 
 123. This assumes infinite repetitions and that Φi and λ are greater than zero. 
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thirty-six periods.124
VI. LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
  Similarly, a greater λ moves prices toward 
cooperative equilibrium with greater speed.  Also note that at cooperative 
equilibrium players may maintain different prices.  This may occur, for 
example, if players have different cost structures. 
The model described above contains many simplifying conditions.  
Turner may be correct in arguing that real-world conditions create 
complications for which emergence of “a pattern of noncompetitive 
pricing . . . requires something which we could, not unreasonably, call a 
‘meeting of minds.’”125
Its limitations notwithstanding, this model is useful in that it provides a 
framework by which cooperation may be viewed as resulting from 
independent action that falls outside the ambit of the Sherman Act’s 
definition of “agreement.” 
  The model described is characterized by constant 
market demand and two market players.  Such characterizations may not 
accurately simulate the vast majority of real-world markets.  Relaxation of 
the conditions assumed by the model indeed may neither destroy the results 
nor invalidate its implications; it simply requires additional time to achieve 
equilibrium.  However, real-world conditions change rapidly, and the 
model’s assumption of infinite discrete repetitions may not adequately 
represent the time available in reality to reach cooperative equilibrium.  
Further, the model is quite sensitive to parameter modifications, and may 
call for computer simulations rather than the artificial simulations applied. 
Such a framework, however, does not necessarily imply that antitrust 
enforcement should be broadened or narrowed.  A conclusion that 
cooperation may result absent conscious coordination can, in fact, be used 
as evidence for either argument. 
It can be said that the effects of cooperation are equivalent regardless of 
whether players consciously coordinate such cooperation.  It follows that 
the Sherman Act should, perhaps, extend its reach to situations of 
cooperation even absent any conscious coordination.  I, however, argue to 
the contrary: a rule that proscribes pricing at cooperative equilibria even in 
the absence of any conscious coordination demands that firms act so 
irrationally by forcing them to deny themselves even independently profit-
maximizing actions that full compliance would be impossible in a 
capitalistic economy. 
Capitalism is founded upon the principle that society’s welfare is 
 
 124. It is not necessary that Φ1 = Φ2. 
 125. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 772 (citing TURNER, supra note 3, at 664). 
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maximized when individuals and firms maintain the opportunity to 
maximize profitability.  Of course, the right to maximize profits is far from 
absolute.  Antitrust law must balance society’s interest in maintaining 
markets in which firms are granted the opportunity to maximize profits and 
in protecting consumers from the negative effects of price-fixing.  The 
Sherman Act wisely draws the line of illegality at the point where 
independent profit-maximization becomes collusive profit-maximization—
that is, at the point where individual firms “agree” to collude.  The model 
described above provides a framework in which defining “agreement” to 
include cooperation absent conscious coordination would force firms to 
ignore market conditions and profit-maximizing possibilities, and, as 
Turner noted, “demand such irrational behavior that full compliance would 
be virtually impossible.”126
As noted, however, the model has limited applicability to real-world 
markets, and perhaps a “meeting of minds” is in fact necessary, in the real 
world, for achieving cooperation.  The model is nevertheless a reminder 
that such equilibria are theoretically possible absent conscious 
coordination.  It is, therefore, dangerous to stretch the definition of 
“agreement” beyond situations in which such coordination is evident. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
I proposed a model of evolution toward cooperation under conditions of 
vast uncertainty and in the absence of conscious price coordination and 
information exchange.  A non-stochastic repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
model was used to show that certain strategies may result in convergence 
toward cooperative equilibria without any agreement, or even possibility of 
agreement among the players.  Rather, cooperation may evolve over time 
as a natural consequence of independent profit-maximizing conduct.  The 
possibility of such convergence suggests that it may be inappropriate to 
extend the Sherman Act’s definition of “agreement” beyond the ambit of 
conscious coordination. 
 
 
 126. TURNER, supra note 3, at 669. 
